The statute of limitations on debt is the deadline for a creditor to file a lawsuit, and each state sets its own. Across the states covered here the main deadline runs from two years to ten, with longer periods in a few states for older or sealed contracts. What varies more than the deadline is everything around it: whether a payment restarts the clock, whether anything can revive an expired debt, and in two states whether the debt survives at all.
Deadlines by state
| State | Deadline on consumer debt | Does a payment restart it? | Statute | Statute text checked |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 3 years open account, 6 years otherwise | Payment works, but only before the bar is complete | Ala. Code §§ 6-2-37, 6-2-34, 6-2-16 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Alaska | 3 years; 10 on a sealed instrument | Yes. A past-due payment restarts it; an acknowledgment must be signed | AS 09.10.053, 09.10.200, 09.10.210 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Arizona | 6 years, credit cards named in the statute | No statute; acknowledgment must be a signed writing | A.R.S. § 12-548(A)(2) | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Arkansas | 5 years written, 3 years otherwise | Payment tolls it, and needs no writing or signature | Ark. Code §§ 16-56-111, 16-56-105 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| California | 4 years written, 2 years unwritten | Only by signed writing; payment rule limited to notes | Code Civ. Proc. §§ 337, 339 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Colorado | 6 years on a liquidated debt, 3 otherwise | Statute declines to say; acknowledgment needs a signed writing | C.R.S. § 13-80-103.5 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Connecticut | 6 years, 3 on an oral express contract | No statute; left to case law | C.G.S. §§ 52-576, 52-581 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Delaware | 3 years, 6 on a note or signed acknowledgment | No statute on payments; a signed acknowledgment carries 6 years | 10 Del. C. §§ 8106, 8109 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| District of Columbia | 3 years on consumer debt, even under seal | No. Nothing extends an expired consumer debt, and suing on one is prohibited | D.C. Code §§ 12-301, 28-3814(f)(10), (l), (o) | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Florida | 5 years written, 4 years otherwise | Reviving a barred debt requires a signed writing | Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11, 95.04 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Georgia | 6 years signed, 4 years on an open account | Only a payment entered on a written evidence of debt | O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-24, 9-3-112 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Hawaii | 6 years, 4 if the debt arose out of state | No statute; case law | HRS §§ 657-1, 657-6 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Idaho | 5 years written, 4 years unwritten | Yes. Any payment equals a signed written promise | Idaho Code §§ 5-216, 5-217, 5-238 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Illinois | 10 years written, 5 years unwritten | Yes, if in writing, and even after the period expires | 735 ILCS 5/13-206 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Indiana | 6 years, written or unwritten alike | Exempt from the writing rule, but not provable from the creditor’s ledger | Ind. Code §§ 34-11-2-7, 34-11-2-9 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Iowa | 10 years written, 5 years unwritten | Code declines to say; acknowledgment needs a signed writing | Iowa Code §§ 614.1, 614.11 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Kansas | 5 years written, 3 years unwritten | Yes. Payment needs no writing; a promise must be signed | K.S.A. 60-511, 60-512, 60-520 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Kentucky | 10 years written (15 if signed by July 15, 2014), 5 years unwritten | Code does not say for unsecured debt | KRS 413.160, 413.090(2), 413.120 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Louisiana | 3 years on an open account | Acknowledgment interrupts, and needs no writing at all | La. Civ. Code arts. 3494, 3464 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Maine | 6 years; collectors 6 from last activity | Not after a collector’s period expires; acknowledgment must be signed | 14 M.R.S. § 752; 32 M.R.S. § 11013 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Maryland | 3 years, 12 on a sealed instrument | No. Nothing revives an expired consumer debt, and suit is barred | Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-101, 5-1202 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Massachusetts | 6 years, 20 years on a sealed or residual contract | Yes. A regulation requires collectors to warn you | M.G.L. c. 260 §§ 2, 13, 14 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Michigan | 6 years, written or oral | Code declines to say; acknowledgment needs a signed writing | MCL 600.5807(9) | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Minnesota | 6 years on consumer debt | No. Not even a signed reaffirmation revives it | Minn. Stat. §§ 541.053, 541.05 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Mississippi | 3 years, then the right is extinguished | Only before expiry; nothing revives it after | Miss. Code §§ 15-1-29, 15-1-3 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Missouri | 10 years on a writing, 5 otherwise | Payment is exempt from the signed-writing rule | RSMo §§ 516.110, 516.120 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Montana | 6 years written (8 for suits filed before Oct. 1, 2025), 5 unwritten | Yes. Part payment or a signed acknowledgment restarts it | MCA 27-2-202, 27-2-409 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Nebraska | 5 years written, 4 years unwritten | Yes, if voluntary; an acknowledgment must be in writing | Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-205, 25-206, 25-216 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Nevada | 6 years written, 4 years otherwise | Only before expiry. Nothing revives it after | NRS 11.190, 11.200 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| New Hampshire | 3 years; 20 on a sealed contract or judgment | No statute on payments or acknowledgments | RSA 508:4, 508:5 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| New Jersey | 6 years, written or oral | Statute expressly declines to say | N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| New Mexico | 6 years written, 4 years on an account | Yes. Payment revives it; an admission must be signed | NMSA §§ 37-1-3, 37-1-4, 37-1-16 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| New York | 3 years | No. Nothing revives an expired consumer debt | CPLR § 214-i | Aug 26, 2026 |
| North Carolina | 3 years | Code declines to say; acknowledgment needs a signed writing | N.C.G.S. § 1-52(1) | Aug 26, 2026 |
| North Dakota | 6 years, written or not | Code preserves the effect of payment without stating it; acknowledgment must be signed | N.D.C.C. §§ 28-01-16, 28-01-36 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Ohio | 6 years | Yes. A payment alone restarts it, no writing needed | R.C. §§ 2305.07, 2305.08 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Oklahoma | 5 years written, 3 years not in writing | Yes. Payment sits outside the writing rule | 12 O.S. §§ 95, 101 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Oregon | 6 years, written or oral | Yes, and interest charges cannot move accrual | ORS 12.080, 12.090, 12.240 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Pennsylvania | 4 years, written or oral | No statute on the question at all | 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Rhode Island | 10 years; 6 on a note | No statute on payments or acknowledgments | R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-1-13, 6A-3-118 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| South Carolina | 3 years | Yes. Any payment equals a written promise by statute | S.C. Code §§ 15-3-530, 15-3-120 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| South Dakota | 6 years; 20 on a sealed instrument | Code preserves the effect of payment without stating it; acknowledgment must be signed | SDCL 15-2-13, 15-2-6, 15-2-29 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Tennessee | 6 years; 4 on a sale of goods | Courts say yes: a voluntary payment or a promise to pay keeps it alive | T.C.A. §§ 28-3-109(a)(3), 47-2-725 (as quoted by Tennessee courts) | Oct 2, 2026† |
| Texas | 4 years | Not for a debt buyer; acknowledgment must be signed | Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004 | Aug 26, 2026* |
| Utah | 6 years written, 4 years otherwise | Yes, with no writing needed, and a third party’s payment counts | Utah Code §§ 78B-2-309, 78B-2-307 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Vermont | 6 years; 14 on a witnessed note | Code preserves the effect of payment; acknowledgment must be signed | 12 V.S.A. §§ 511, 508, 591, 592 | Oct 2, 2026 |
| Virginia | 5 years signed, 3 years unsigned | Effectively yes. Open accounts accrue from the last payment | Va. Code §§ 8.01-246, 8.01-249(8) | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Washington | 6 years | Only before expiry. Nothing revives it afterward | RCW 4.16.040, 4.16.270 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| West Virginia | 10 years signed writing, 5 years otherwise | Code declines to say; acknowledgment needs a signed writing | W. Va. Code §§ 55-2-6, 55-2-8 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Wisconsin | 6 years, then the right is extinguished | Code does not say, and the right is already gone | Wis. Stat. §§ 893.43, 893.05 | Aug 26, 2026 |
| Wyoming | 10 years written, 8 unwritten | Yes. A payment or signed acknowledgment restarts it | W.S. 1-3-105, 1-3-119 | Oct 2, 2026 |
* The Texas page does not state a retrieval date; the date shown is when it was published. † The official Tennessee Code is published online by LexisNexis behind a captcha we did not bypass, so the Tennessee row is taken from Tennessee Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions that quote the code, a secondary source. Sorting by deadline orders states by the shortest period in the summary.
We built this state by state, quoting each figure from the state’s own published code, and the table now covers all fifty states and the District of Columbia. The one exception to quoting the code directly is Tennessee, where the official code sits behind a captcha and we relied on Tennessee court opinions that quote it.
Why the same advice is wrong in different states
Most general guidance about old debt gives one rule: never make a payment, because any payment restarts the clock. Across these states that advice is correct, wrong, conditional, or unanswerable depending entirely on where you are.
In Ohio, South Carolina, and Idaho it is right, and South Carolina is the bluntest about it: § 15-3-120 says “payment of any part of principal or interest is equivalent to a promise in writing,” so a bare payment does what a spoken admission cannot, and Idaho’s § 5-238 uses almost the same words. In New York, Washington, and Maryland it is wrong once the period has run, because all three provide that nothing restarts, revives, or extends an expired period. In Texas it depends on who holds the debt. And in Pennsylvania, Michigan, North Carolina, New Jersey, and Colorado, the legislature deliberately declined to answer, leaving it to the courts. Kentucky, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Tennessee have no general statute on it at all (Tennessee courts treat a voluntary payment as keeping the debt alive), and Delaware addresses signed acknowledgments but not payments.
What this means in practice: the question that determines your answer is not “how long is the statute of limitations on debt,” but “which state’s law applies, and who is holding this debt.” Those two facts change the deadline, change whether a payment is dangerous, change whether the collector may sue you at all, and in one state change whether the debt still exists.
In two states the debt actually dies
Every state here bars the lawsuit while leaving the balance alive, with two exceptions. Wisconsin‘s § 893.05 provides that when the period expires, “the right is extinguished as well as the remedy.” That is a difference in kind rather than degree.
Louisiana, the one civil law state in the country, reaches somewhere adjacent by a different route. A prescribed debt there becomes a natural obligation under Civil Code art. 1762, which art. 1761 defines as an obligation “not enforceable by judicial action” where “whatever has been freely performed… may not be reclaimed.” The creditor cannot sue, but a voluntary payment cannot be clawed back either.
Mississippi does the same thing and goes one step further. Section 15-1-3(1) provides that completing the period “shall defeat and extinguish the right as well as the remedy,” and its revival subsection then applies only where “the statute of limitations not having run.” So in Mississippi the right dies and the ordinary restart mechanism is unavailable afterward, leaving only the possibility of a fresh signed promise.
Neither protection is automatic, though. Wisconsin's § 893.01 provides that the objection “may only be taken by answer or motion to dismiss,” and Mississippi's Rule 8(c) lists the statute of limitations among defenses that must be pleaded, with no exception for extinguished claims. In both states a debtor who ignores a lawsuit can still lose by default on a debt that legally no longer exists.
Where suing on old debt is actually prohibited
Most states leave you with a defense you must raise. Eleven of the fifty-one jurisdictions here go further, forbidding the lawsuit itself or the threat of one.
- Washington makes it an unfair practice to sue or arbitrate a claim the collector knows or should know is barred, and RCW 19.16.450 then permanently strips interest, fees, and collection costs from that claim for every future owner.
- The District of Columbia makes it an unfair practice to initiate a suit on consumer debt the collector knows or should know is time-barred, defines debt collector to include original creditors, and provides that no later payment or affirmation extends an expired period.
- Maryland provides that a creditor or collector “may not initiate a consumer debt collection action” after the period expires, and that no payment or affirmation afterward revives it.
- Maine provides that a debt collector or debt buyer may not bring suit more than six years after the consumer’s last activity on the debt, and that no later payment or affirmation revives or extends it.
- Texas prohibits a debt buyer from suing or initiating arbitration once the period runs, and provides that payment does not revive the claim.
- California prohibits suit under both Code of Civil Procedure § 337(d) and Civil Code § 1788.56, and requires a specific written notice.
- North Carolina bars a debt buyer from suing or otherwise attempting to collect, and makes a non-compliant default judgment void and vacatable.
- Minnesota makes it a prohibited practice to “commence legal action to collect a debt outside the limitations period,” with a parallel rule for medical debt. It reaches commencing the action rather than threatening it.
- Oregon makes it unlawful for a debt collector to file suit once the period has run, and separately prevents interest charges from moving the accrual date forward.
- Nevada prohibits licensed agencies and debt buyers from suing on a debt they know or should know is past the deadline. On the statute’s own definitions that leaves a gap: it does not reach a bank suing on its own account.
- Oklahoma approaches it from the other end, making the threat to sue on an expired debt an unlawful practice under its consumer protection act.
Most state codes never mention credit cards
The most common question about this topic is which deadline applies to a credit card balance. In forty-eight of the fifty-one jurisdictions here, the code does not say. The statutes describe written contracts, unwritten contracts, accounts stated, liquidated debts, and promissory notes, and leave courts to decide where a card balance belongs. In Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, and West Virginia that unresolved question is worth five years; in Louisiana it is worth seven; and in Kentucky, where a written contract signed before July 15, 2014 carries fifteen years against five for an unwritten one, it can be worth ten. In Montana it is worth one year, six against five, after a 2025 law cut the written-contract period from eight. Hawaii adds a different twist: six years generally, but four where the claim arose outside the state, and the code does not say where a card debt arises.
Three jurisdictions are exceptions. The District of Columbia applies three years to any consumer debt “whether the legal basis of the claim sounds in contract, account stated, open account, or other cause.” Arizona names credit cards outright in A.R.S. § 12-548(A)(2). Ohio reaches the same clarity from the other direction, giving consumer transactions their own provision that applies “whether or not reduced to writing or signed by the party to be charged.” Wisconsin is the only state we have found that defines when a credit card claim accrues, at § 425.103: failure to pay when due on two occasions within any twelve-month period.
A protection eight states share, and almost nobody mentions
Reading these codes side by side surfaces things a single state page never would. Eight of them, drafted in different centuries and different traditions, contain the same rule: a creditor’s own record of a payment is not sufficient proof that the payment happened. New Jersey, Michigan, Wisconsin, Colorado, Massachusetts, Indiana, Maine, and Vermont all provide that an endorsement or memorandum of a payment, written by or on behalf of the party receiving it, is not sufficient to take the case out of the limitations statute. If a collector claims your clock restarted because of a payment, its own ledger entry is not enough in those states.
What a limitations period does not do
Except in Wisconsin and Mississippi, the deadline bars the lawsuit rather than erasing the balance. A collector may keep contacting you, and the account may keep appearing on your credit reports, because credit reporting runs on a separate federal clock, generally seven years for most negative account information under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. A debt can be too old to sue on while still on your reports, and it can fall off your reports while a collector still calls.
The defense is also never automatic. In every state here, including the ones that prohibit the lawsuit outright, the person being sued has to raise it. A defendant who ignores the papers can have a default judgment entered on a debt no one was entitled to sue over, and that judgment carries its own collection powers and a much longer life.
The national picture
Consumers filed 316,737 debt collection complaints with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the 12 months ending October 7, 2026. Of those, 78,609, or 25%, were categorized as a collector taking or threatening to take negative or legal action — the category covering threats to sue, and the conduct these deadlines govern.
That share varies widely. Arizona is the outlier at 56% of its complaints, more than double the national rate, while South Carolina sits at 12% despite ranking 6th nationally in total complaints. Each state page carries its own figures alongside its statutes. These are raw complaint counts, not rates, and are not adjusted for population. A complaint is an allegation the CFPB has published, not a finding that a company broke the law. The figures refresh weekly.
Download the data and how to cite it
The full table is available as a CSV file with one row for each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia. The Tennessee row is marked as drawn from court opinions rather than the official code text. Each row carries the summary shown above, the statutes cited, a link to the state page with the full quotations, and the date we retrieved the statute text. The two numeric columns are the shortest and longest periods named in the summary, for sorting; they are not a substitute for the state page.
The table and the CSV file are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). You may copy, adapt, and republish them, including commercially, as long as you credit My Credit Guide (mycreditguide.org), link to the license, and say if you changed anything. The license covers our table and summaries, not the statute text we quote.
The table was last verified on October 2, 2026. If you use it, please cite this page:
Steven Reynolds, “Debt Statute of Limitations by State,” MyCreditGuide.org, last verified October 2, 2026, https://mycreditguide.org/debt-statute-of-limitations/.
If you find a figure that does not match the current statute, tell us through the contact page and we will check it against the code and correct it.
How we source these pages
Every limitations period, revival rule, and collection restriction on these pages is quoted from the state’s own published code: the legislature’s statute site or the publisher the state designates as official. We do not cite legal directories, law firm summaries, or other guides. Where a state’s code does not answer a question, we say so instead of filling the gap, which happens more often than most guides admit.
Where a state publishes a currency date for its code, we cite it. Several do not, including California, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Virginia, and in those cases we identify each provision by its own amendment history and give the date we retrieved the text. Where a state tells us its website is not the official version, as South Carolina and Washington both do, we say that too.
These pages explain what the statutes say. They are general information, not legal advice, and they cannot establish when a particular debt accrued or how a court would read a disputed provision. If you have been sued, the deadline on the papers is short, and speaking with an attorney or a legal aid organization in your state is worth the call.
Related
- Dispute letter builder for reporting errors on your credit file, which is a separate process from a limitations defense
- Current average credit card APR, updated from Federal Reserve data
Frequently asked questions
What is the statute of limitations on debt?
It is the deadline for a creditor or collector to file a lawsuit to collect a debt. It is set by state law and, among the states covered here, ranges from two years to ten. After it expires the debt itself normally still exists; what changes is the ability to win a lawsuit over it. Wisconsin and Mississippi are the exceptions, where the right itself is extinguished.
Which state’s statute of limitations applies to my debt?
That depends on the facts, and it is not always the state you live in. Several states apply a borrowing statute that uses the law of the place where the claim accrued when that period is shorter, including Pennsylvania, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Kansas, Idaho, Delaware, Hawaii, Alaska, and Wyoming. Arizona runs the other way, providing in A.R.S. § 12-548(B) that its own section applies where another jurisdiction’s law conflicts.
Does the statute of limitations erase the debt?
In forty-nine of the fifty-one jurisdictions here, no: the statute bars the lawsuit rather than extinguishing the obligation. Wisconsin and Mississippi are the exceptions: Wisconsin’s § 893.05 and Mississippi’s § 15-1-3(1) both extinguish the right as well as the remedy. Louisiana converts a prescribed debt into a natural obligation, which cannot be enforced in court but which supports a voluntary payment that cannot then be reclaimed.